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DECEPTIVELY SIMPLE: FRAMING, INTUITION,
AND JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING OF
FORENSIC FEATURE-COMPARISON
METHODS EVIDENCE
Jane Campbell Moriarty*
Without appropriate estimates of accuracy, an examiner’s statement that
two samples are similar—or even indistinguishable—is scientifically
meaningless: it has no probative value, and considerable potential for
prejudicial impact. Nothing—not training, personal experience nor
professional practices—can substitute for adequate empirical
demonstration of accuracy.1

INTRODUCTION
During the Symposium for the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee
on Evidence Rules, held at Boston College on October 27, 2017, the
scientists, statisticians, legal academics, and criminal defense lawyers
presented a unified theme: the federal courts have not fulfilled their role as
gatekeepers to exclude or limit potentially unreliable feature-comparison
methods of forensic science evidence (“FCM evidence”).2 The only voiced
* Carol Los Mansmann Chair in Faculty Scholarship and Professor, Duquesne University
School of Law. This Article was prepared for the Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony,
Daubert, and Rule 702, held on October 27, 2017, at Boston College School of Law. The
Symposium took place under the sponsorship of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee
on Evidence Rules. For an overview of the Symposium, see Daniel J. Capra, Foreword:
Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1459
(2018). Many thanks to Professor Capra for inviting me to speak at the Boston College Law
School Symposium and to write for this Fordham Law Review Symposium. Additional thanks
to the patient and thoughtful editors of the Fordham Law Review; to Richard Bielawa for his
fine research assistance; and to Lauren Gailey for her kind recommendation and friendship.
Finally, thanks to my colleague Bruce Ledewitz for our frequent chats that sharpen the
questions and provide insights to the answers. I’m so grateful for the friendship and
collegiality.
1. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURECOMPARISON METHODS 46 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/
files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
R76Y-7VU] (emphasis omitted).
2. These types of forensic-science evidence, which compare a known and unknown
sample, include handwriting, shoe print, microscopic hairs, fingerprint, and bite marks, among
other forms of evidence. DNA is a type of FCM evidence but is methodologically distinct
from these others forms and is not addressed in this Article. FCM evidence has frequently
been referred to as “individualization evidence.” See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Individualization
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dissents came from the DOJ and FBI lawyers, who argued that the courts had
been admitting such pattern-matching evidence properly and that the
evidence was indeed reliable.3
For decades, scientists and legal academics have been highly critical of
claims that FCM evidence has a reliable foundation and can reliably match a
known and unknown sample.4 Moreover, as Innocence Project data and
analysis of such data establish, wrongful convictions often include erroneous
FCM evidence.5
Two national committees have written reports about the shortcomings of
forensic science: The National Research Council for the National Academy
of Sciences report in 2009 (“NRC report”) and the President’s Council of
Advisors on Science and Technology report in 2016 (“PCAST report”).6 The
Is Dead, Long Live Individualization! Reforms of Reporting Practices for Fingerprint
Analysis in the United States, 13 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 117, 119–22 (2014) (discussing the
history of the term “individualization” and the problems it poses); Jane Campbell Moriarty,
Will History Be Servitude?: The NAS Report on Forensic Science and the Role of the
Judiciary, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 299, 300; see also David H. Kaye, Identification,
Individualization and Uniqueness: What’s the Difference, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 85, 85–
94 (2009).
3. See Symposium, Forensic Evidence, Daubert, and Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV.
1459 (2018).
4. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 87 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/228091.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLW3-Y6VQ]; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON
SCI. & TECH., supra note 1; Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent
Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985 (2005); Itiel E. Dror & David
Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600 (2006); Brandon L.
Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95
VA. L. REV. 1 (2009); Paul C. Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 150 (1993); Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science:
The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2007); Jennifer L. Mnookin,
Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13 (2001); Jennifer L.
Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the
Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723 (2001); Jennifer L. Mnookin et al.,
The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 725 (2011); Jane
Campbell Moriarty, “Misconvictions,” Science and the Ministers of Justice, 86 NEB. L. REV.
1 (2007); Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals, Tragic
Flaws, and Judicial Gatekeeping, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2005, at 16; Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near)
Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH S107 (2005); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal
Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000); D. Michael
Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of
Handwriting Identification ‘Expertise,’ 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989); D. Michael Risinger
with Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting
Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21 (1996); Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman,
Failed Forensics: How Forensic Science Lost Its Way and How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149 (2008); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm
Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892 (2005); Adam B. Shniderman,
Prosecutors Respond to Calls for Forensic Science Reform: More Sharks in Dirty Water, 126
YALE L.J. FORUM 348 (2017).
5. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 4, at 14 (explaining that 82 percent of the 137
exonerees’ cases they reviewed involved “invalid forensic science testimony”).
6. Other national bodies conduct research, collect data, and issue publications about
various aspects of forensic science, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology
and the National Commission on Forensic Science. See Forensic Science, NIST,
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NRC report concluded that, other than DNA analysis, “no forensic method
has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a
high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a
specific individual or source.”7 The PCAST report was even more pointed
in its critique, finding shortcomings in virtually all aspects of FCM evidence,
from foundation through application.8
Despite the disturbing criticism of FCM evidence and its association with
wrongful convictions, courts have been generally unwilling to exclude or
even limit experts’ conclusions about such evidence—a point made
repeatedly by the speakers at the conference and in the NRC report.9 Even
more curiously, courts are much more willing to exclude scientific evidence
in civil cases when such evidence is challenged under a reliability standard.10
So what explains the intransigence of the judiciary refusing to take seriously
the critiques of FCM evidence?
While there are many explanations for this persistent refusal to recognize
the shortcomings of FCM evidence,11 one idea I suggested in 2010 still
resonates: courts do not appreciate the complexity of FCM evidence and,
believing pattern matching is a straightforward and uncomplicated endeavor,
admit the evidence under the assumption that cross-examination can reveal
its problematic shortcomings.12 FCM evidence is deceptive in its apparent
simplicity—something courts do not recognize. In fact, rather than requiring
the prosecution to meet the standard of reliability of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.13 and Federal Rule of Evidence 702,14 courts have
employed different ways of sidestepping a detailed reliability analysis, with
some simply latching onto Daubert’s comment that “[v]igorous crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
https://www.nist.gov/topics/forensic-science [https://perma.cc/5RHV-Q4YE] (last visited
Feb.
14,
2018);
National
Commission
on
Forensic
Science,
NIST,
https://www.nist.gov/topics/forensic-science/national-commission-forensic-science
[https://perma.cc/32RK-QA4T] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
7. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 7.
8. See infra Part I.
9. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 11 (“[T]he vast majority of the reported
opinions in criminal cases indicate that trial judges rarely exclude or restrict expert testimony
offered by prosecutors: most reported opinions also indicate that the appellate courts routinely
deny appeals contesting trial court decisions admitting forensic evidence against criminal
defendants.”).
10. See Moriarty, supra note 2, at 308–09.
11. See, e.g., Stephanie L. Damon-Moore, Trial Judges and the Forensic Science
Problem, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1555–59 (2017) (discussing multiple reasons for judicial
resistance to properly gatekeep forensic science); Shniderman, supra note 4, at 352–54 (listing
various reasons, including a lack of scientific aptitude, a “systemic pro-prosecution bias on the
bench,” and the desire for reelection by proclaiming oneself tough on crime); see also United
States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp.
2d 549, 572 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (recognizing the shortcomings of fingerprint comparison but
allowing it into evidence because to do otherwise would “make the best the enemy of the
good”).
12. Moriarty, supra note 2, at 319 (suggesting that “[i]t may well be that fingerprint,
handwriting, and microscopic hair comparisons seem to be ‘simple’ problems for judges”).
13. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
14. See infra Part II (discussing these standards).
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burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky
but admissible evidence.”15
This Article explains how courts have skirted the reliability problem of
FCM evidence and argues that judges perceive the question of FCM evidence
to be a simple problem that cross-examination can solve. Relying on insights
from cognitive science to help explain the resistance of the courts to FCM
evidence challenges, the Article urges courts to recognize the complexity of
FCM evidence and refocus on the danger such evidence poses for continued
wrongful conviction. By framing the admissibility of FCM evidence as an
“easy” question, courts are relying on heuristics—that is, shortcuts—to solve
complex problems. As this Article explains, using heuristics can lead to more
error-prone decisions, as such shortcuts are vulnerable to various cognitive
biases and systemic fallacies. In both reasoning and language, courts exhibit
biased-affected decision-making.
Part I of the Article briefly reviews the NRC report and the PCAST report
while Part II discusses cases addressing FCM evidence. The cognitive
science that may explain the courts’ consistent approaches to the evidence is
considered in Part III. Part III then applies these concepts to judicial
decision-making related to FCM evidence—a complicated problem in need
of greater analysis.
I. THE NRC AND PCAST REPORTS
Following a three-year congressionally mandated study of forensic
science,16 the National Academy of Sciences issued the groundbreaking NRC
report.17 The NRC report concluded that, except for DNA analysis, no
forensic method “has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to
consistently and with a high degree of certainty support conclusions about . . .
‘matching’ of an unknown item of evidence to a specific known source.”18
Strong words from a body as well regarded as the National Academy of
Sciences, a nonpartisan organization that has addressed major science-related
issues for more than 150 years.19
The NRC report described the use of forensic-science evidence in the
courtroom, recognizing both the shortcomings of current methods and the
need for improvement in the forensic sciences.20 The NRC report found that
the “existing legal regime,” which included trial and appellate standards,
judges, and lawyers who lacked scientific expertise, was “inadequate to the

15. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
16. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 1, at 22
(describing the genesis of the NRC report).
17. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4.
18. Id. at 87.
19. For a fuller understanding of the significant role that the National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering and Medicine have played in addressing pressing issues, see its website
at The National Academies: An Overview, NAT’L ACADS. SCI. ENGINEERING & MED.,
http://www.nationalacademies.org/brochure/index.html [https://perma.cc/6ZU4-NZ5L] (last
visited Feb. 14, 2018).
20. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 85–86.
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task of curing the documented ills of the forensic science disciplines.”21 In
the chapter detailing the shortcomings of forensic science as courtroom
evidence, the report addresses the courts’ role in managing poor-quality
forensic science:
“[T]he undeniable reality is that the community of forensic science
professionals has not done nearly as much as it reasonably could have done
to establish either the validity of its approach or the accuracy of its
practitioners’ conclusions,” and the courts have been “utterly ineffective”
in addressing this problem.22

The report also found that courts were not successfully applying the Daubert
reliability standard,23 noting with irony that appellate courts were more
willing to second-guess trial court decisions about expert evidence in civil
cases than they were decisions in criminal matters.24
The initial reaction to the NRC report seemed encouraging, with the U.S.
Supreme Court even commenting on it in a case involving the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. The Court mentioned the problems of
subjectivity, bias, and the unreliability of feature-comparison evidence,
specifically mentioning fingerprints, pattern-impression analysis, toolmarks,
and firearms.25 Law schools held conferences and published symposia
articles about the perceived importance of the NRC report and its
implications for courtroom evidence.26 Many, including this author,27 hoped
that the NRC report would spur courts to reevaluate the way they were
treating FCM evidence.28
However, despite the publication of the NRC report, “courts largely
ignored the report’s findings and continued to allow forensic scientists,
particularly in the pattern-impression disciplines, to testify to
individualization statements without a scientific basis for the statements.”29
A handful of courts limited the conclusions of the experts,30 but most courts
21. Id. at 85.
22. Id. at 108–09 (alteration in original) (first quoting Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity
of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L.
PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 134 (2008); then quoting Neufeld, supra note 4, at S109).
23. See infra Part II (explaining this standard further).
24. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 11.
25. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321 (2009).
26. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The 2009 NAS Forensic Science Report: A Literature
Review, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 380–81 nn.24–29 (2012) (listing the conferences, written
symposia, and articles published at the time).
27. Moriarty, supra note 2, at 325–26 (suggesting that if the Supreme Court held lower
courts accountable for forensic-science evidence gatekeeping, it would spur the judiciary to
evaluate the testimony more accurately).
28. Giannelli, supra note 26, at 378 (collecting scholarly descriptions of the NRC report
calling it “a ‘blockbuster, a watershed, a scathing critique, a milestone, and pioneering’”).
29. Jennifer Friedman & Jessica Brand, It Is Now up to the Courts: “Forensic Science in
Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods,” 57 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 367, 371–72 (2017).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Willock, 696 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547 (D. Md. 2010) (limiting
the degree of certainty that the expert could give about a match); United States v. Taylor, 663
F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1180 (D.N.M. 2009); United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574–75
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that permitting the expert to testify to a “reasonable degree of
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continued to admit the evidence as they always had. Some courts avoided
the NRC report by suggesting that it was not intended for use in the
courtroom.31 Others have sidestepped the NRC report by discussing the long
history of admitting such evidence.32 Some courts proudly “remain[] faithful
to their tradition” of admitting the evidence.33 A number of courts categorize
the evidence as not particularly scientific and therefore do not really employ
Daubert’s reliability analysis,34 and several judges have simply referenced
the opinions of other courts that analyzed such evidence and found it
sufficiently reliable.35 Some decisions patently ignore the NRC report,
ballistic certainty” would be seriously misleading and limiting the opinion of the expert to
ballistics match testimony to a statement of “more likely than not”). Professor Imwinkelried
sees a “definite judicial trend” to prohibit experts from testifying to overstated claims of
certainty. Edward Imwinkelried, The Importance of Forensic Metrology in Preventing
Miscarriages of Justice: Intellectual Honesty About the Uncertainty of Measurement in
Scientific Analysis, 7 J. MARSHALL L.J. 333, 352 (2014).
31. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50, 59 (Mass. 2010) (“The NAS
Report does not conclude that fingerprint evidence is so unreliable that courts should no longer
admit it.”); see also Allen v. United States, No. 4:07CV00027 ERW, 2011 WL 13182909, at
*3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 29, 2011) (“The NAS Report, at most, calls into question whether the
techniques used by ballistics and fingerprint experts to generate their conclusions can be
counted on, in all circumstances, to produce totally reliable, unequivocal findings. It does not
indicate that the conclusions of the experts in this case were wrong; the NAS Report does not
suggest that the recovered bullets were not actually discharged from the firearm associated
with Movant, or that the fingerprint matched to Movant was not actually Movant’s.”); United
States v. Rose, 672 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725 (D. Md. 2009) (claiming, inaccurately, that the cochair of the NRC report “made it clear that nothing in the [r]eport was intended to answer the
‘question whether forensic evidence in a particular case is admissible under applicable law’”);
Moriarty, supra note 2, at 322 (discussing this inaccuracy).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 990 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hile we
must agree . . . that this record does not show the technique has been subject to testing that
would meet all of the standards of science, it would be unrealistic in the extreme for us to
ignore the countervailing evidence. Fingerprint identification has been used extensively by
law enforcement agencies all over the world for almost a century.”); Meskimen v.
Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 526, 535 (Ky. 2013) (“In this case, the Commonwealth offered
evidence that has been admissible in the state of Kentucky for many years. Microscopic hair
analysis is a scientifically reliable method, and we, therefore, do not require that a Daubert
hearing be held with regard to the admittance of such evidence.”); State v. Pigott, 325 P.3d
247, 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (“The reliability of fingerprint identification has been tested
in our adversarial system for over a century and routinely subjected to peer review.”);
Moriarty, supra note 2, at 304 (discussing the “long history of use” fallacy in many cases).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Casey, 928 F. Supp. 2d 397, 400 (D.P.R. 2013) (stating that
“the Court . . . remains faithful to the long-standing tradition of allowing the unfettered
testimony of qualified ballistics experts”).
34. See, e.g., Gambora, 933 N.E.2d at 60 (noting that the issues highlighted in the NRC
report are “important and deserve consideration” but declining to take such consideration
because of the “plausible” proposition that examiners can compare two prints and determine
that they came from the same source); see also United States v. Willock, 696 F. Supp. 2d 636,
571 (D. Md. 2010) (noting that “it may be debatable” whether firearms-related toolmark
identification evidence is “science” but that it is “clearly technical or specialized” with a
“baseline level of credibility”).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Ashburn, 88 F. Supp. 3d 239, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“This
court too ‘sees no need to duplicate the considerable efforts of those courts.’” (quoting United
States v. Sebbern, No. 10 Cr. 87(SLT), 2012 WL 5989813, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012));
id. at 249 (“[G]iven the extensive record presented in other cases, the court joins in precluding
this expert witness from testifying that he is ‘certain’ or ‘100%’ sure of his conclusions that
certain items match.”); United States v. Sebbern, No. 10 Cr. 87(SLT), 2012 WL 5989813, at
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despite it being raised in the case.36 And some jurists use a combination of
ways to avoid the implications of the NRC report. As Professor Paul
Giannelli recently concluded when reviewing the cases, “[d]espite the [NRC]
report, courts generally continued to admit the same evidence.”37
Although the NRC report explained how the forensic science specialties
lacked empirical data to support the claims that analysts made in court and
provided recommendations for both developing protocols and pursuing
research to improve the specialties, little progress was made to improve those
specialties.38 Given the courts’ repeated willingness to look past the
shortcomings of the evidence, there was little incentive to improve the quality
of what was presented in court.
In April 2009, President Barack Obama announced the President’s Council
of Advisors on Science and Technology.39 In 2015, the President tasked
PCAST with determining “whether there are additional steps on the scientific
side, beyond those already taken by the Administration in the aftermath of a
highly critical [NRC Report] on the state of the forensic sciences, that could
help ensure the validity of forensic evidence used in the Nation’s legal
system.”40
Over the course of a year, PCAST compiled and reviewed voluminous
material and studies, and in 2016 it issued the PCAST report.41 The PCAST
report focused on “defining the validity and reliability of one specific area
within forensic science: forensic feature-comparison methods.”42 These
methods fit within the field of “metrology—the science of measurement and
its application.”43 The authors described the two different types of feature
comparison methods, objective and subjective, discussed the scientific

*8 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (“This Court . . . sees no need to hold a separate Daubert hearing.
This Court has reviewed [other] opinions . . . and is persuaded by those thorough and wellreasoned decisions that ballistics testimony of the sort proffered in this case is admissible
under Daubert. This Court sees no need to duplicate the considerable efforts of those courts.”);
United States v. Stone, 848 F. Supp. 2d 714, 718 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“[T]his Court finds no
basis to expand on, or depart from, the holdings of numerous courts that latent fingerprint
identification evidence is reliable under the five-factor test developed by the Supreme Court
in Daubert.”).
36. See, e.g., Patterson v. State, 146 A.3d 496, 502–03 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016)
(ignoring the NRC report issue raised by the defendant but noting that toolmark identification
is generally accepted within the scientific community), cert. denied, 155 A.3d 443 (Md. 2017).
37. Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Daubert’s Failure, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3031227 [https://perma.cc/N32H-VL36].
38. Friedman & Brand, supra note 29, at 368.
39. About PCAST, WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/
eop/ostp/pcast/about [https://perma.cc/6RLC-X8D2] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
40. Eric Lander et al., PCAST Releases Report on Forensic Science in Criminal Courts,
WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 20, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/09/20/
pcast-releases-report-forensic-science-criminal-courts [https://perma.cc/4GMJ-WHSQ].
41. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 1.
42. Id. at 44.
43. Id. Forensic feature-comparison methods involve a determination of whether “two
sets of features agree within a given measurement tolerance.” Id. at 44 n.93.
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criteria for both foundational validity and validity as applied, and then
addressed the views of the forensic-science community.44
The PCAST report is clear in its recommendation about what is necessary
to establish validity of forensic feature-comparison methods:
Scientific validity and reliability require that a method has been
subjected to empirical testing, under conditions appropriate to its intended
use, that provides valid estimates of how often the method reaches an
incorrect conclusion.
For subjective feature-comparison methods,
appropriately designed black-box studies are required, in which many
examiners render decisions about many independent tests (typically,
involving “questioned” samples and one or more “known” samples) and
the error rates are determined. Without appropriate estimates of accuracy,
an examiner’s statement that two samples are similar—or even
indistinguishable—is scientifically meaningless: it has no probative value,
and considerable potential for prejudicial impact. Nothing—not training,
personal experience nor professional practices—can substitute for adequate
empirical demonstration of accuracy.45

The PCAST report indicates that methods must be empirically tested in an
appropriate fashion to make sure they are accurate: “Without an appropriate
estimate of its accuracy [using appropriate empirical testing], a metrological
method is useless—because one has no idea how to interpret its results.”46
The PCAST report also included a number of recommendations for various
bodies, including one directed at the judiciary: “When deciding the
admissibility of expert testimony, Federal judges should take into account the
appropriate scientific criteria for assessing scientific validity.”47
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS ABOUT FCM EVIDENCE
Despite robust challenges to FCM evidence over the last three decades,
courts have rebuffed nearly all claims under a Daubert reliability standard,48
44. Id. at 44–66.
45. Id. at 46 (emphasis omitted). For further explanations of the PCAST report, see
Friedman & Brand, supra note 29, at 374–81; Giannelli, supra note 37, at 51–53; David H.
Kaye, How Daubert and Its Progeny Have Failed Criminalistics Evidence and a Few Things
the Judiciary Could Do About It, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1639, 1651–58 (2018).
46. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 1, at 48.
47. Id. at 145. For additional commentary on the PCAST report and its potential
implications, see 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 29:11–29:15 (2017); 1 PAUL GIANNELLI ET AL., SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE §§ 1.08(b), 13.04, 14.03 (Matthew Bender ed., 2017); 2 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra,
§ 16.01.
48. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The socalled Daubert trilogy, composed of the Daubert decision, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire, Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), collectively
require that all expert testimony be reliable. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has intentionally
incorporated the requirements of those, and other, cases. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory
committee’s notes on 2000 amendments (“Rule 702 has been amended in response to
Daubert . . . and to the many cases applying Daubert . . . .”). Rule 702 requires the expert to
be qualified, the testimony to be both specialized and helpful, and proof that “the testimony is
based on sufficient facts or data; . . . is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
[that] the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” FED.
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a Frye general-acceptance standard,49 and under various other forms of
challenges, such as newly discovered evidence50 or a claim of constitutional
infirmity.51 Although the NRC report provided a scientific consensus about
the shortcomings of FCM evidence, courts have nearly uniformly refused to
address these shortcomings52 and have found ways to minimize or sidestep
the importance of the report.53
R. EVID. 702. Decisions involving interpretations of Daubert with respect to FCM evidence
are discussed at length infra.
49. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013–14 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For cases upholding
forensic science under a Frye general-acceptance standard, see People v. Luna, 989 N.E.2d
655, 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (concluding that a Frye hearing was not required for fingerprints,
citing sister courts, and holding that “the trial court properly took judicial notice of the general
acceptance of the ACE–V methodology within the relevant scientific community”); State v.
Sheehan, 273 P.3d 417, 425 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (holding no abuse of discretion for admitting
the fingerprint expert’s testimony without a hearing on general acceptance because of judicial
precedent and the “longstanding reliance on fingerprint evidence”); State v. Lizarraga, 364
P.3d 810, 830 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that there was no error denying a Frye
hearing and request for limits on expert testimony); State v. Pigott, 325 P.3d 247, 250 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2014) (“[T]he reliability of fingerprint identification has been tested in our adversarial
system for over a century and routinely subjected to peer review. The trial court considered
all of this in reaching its conclusion that a Frye hearing was not needed. The trial court
expressly found that the identification analysis is accepted in the relevant scientific
community.” (footnote omitted)).
50. See Sarah Lucy Cooper, Judicial Responses to Shifting Scientific Opinion in Forensic
Identification Evidence and Newly Discovered Evidence Claims in the United States: The
Influence of Finality and Legal Process Theory, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEG. STUD. 649, 672 (2015)
(reviewing cases in a variety of areas and discussing the consistent judicial resistance to the
NRC report as a form of newly discovered evidence and finding that “there is a judicial
resistance towards allowing claims that shifting scientific opinion about various forensic
identification methods . . . qualify as newly discovered evidence”).
51. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, No. 4:07CV00027 ERW, 2011 WL 13182909, at *2–
3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 29, 2011) (holding that the NRC report did not suggest that all forensic
science was of questionable reliability or materially inaccurate for purposes of conviction and
sentencing, which was the required showing to prevail under the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment); accord United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031,
1040–42 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting a due process claim about a conviction that rested in part
on compositional analysis of bullet lead evidence that the FBI stopped using due its
unreliability); Rice v. Gavin, No. 15-291, 2016 WL 3009392, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2016
(holding that the defendant’s claim that the NRC report undermined the integrity of the bullet
comparison evidence was meritless and did not constitute a due process violation).
52. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole & Gary Edmond, Science Without Precedent: The Impact of
the National Research Council Report on the Admissibility and Use of Forensic Science
Evidence in the United States, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEG. STUD. 585, 613 (2015) (“[B]y and large,
[the NRC report] has not been received as a scientific statement requiring engagement, let
alone deference or alignment, by most judges.”); Kaye, supra note 45, at 1640 (“The years
that followed [the publication of the NRC report] proved frustrating to those who had hoped
that the courts would demand the scientific proof of validity and accuracy that the committee
found absent in some areas as a condition for admissibility.”).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 14–cr–00412–TEH, 2015 WL 5012949, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015) (noting that the NRC report “has been considered and rejected as a
basis for excluding ballistics evidence by numerous courts”); United States v. Otero, 849 F.
Supp. 2d 425, 438 (D.N.J. 2012) (mentioning concerns raised by the NRC report but rejecting
them as undermining the reliability of the evidence and stating that “the district court must
conduct a flexible reliability analysis and leave questions about the strength of evidence to the
jury”); Gee v. United States, 54 A.3d 1249, 1266–68 (D.C. 2012) (holding no abuse of
discretion where the lower court concluded that the NRC report was not a “learned treatise”
under FRE 803(18)); People v. Luna, 989 N.E.2d 655, 674–75 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (citing
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Many opinions do not analyze the Daubert factors54 in depth. In fact, the
majority of opinions have avoided any serious analysis of the factors or have
merely given lip service to the factors by concluding the test has been met,
despite the Advisory Committee’s admonishment that “testing” means an
objective rather than a “subjective, conclusory approach that cannot be
assessed for reliability.”55 As Professor David Kaye concludes, courts alter
and misapply the factors and shy “away from scrutinizing criminalistics
evidence of identity as Daubert originally seemed to require.”56 More
typically, when the evidence—even with references to the NRC report—is
challenged, the courts have cited prior case law,57 looked to the decisions of
sister courts,58 focused on the experience of the experts, claimed the Daubert
factors are meant to be helpful and not definitive,59 or claimed any concerns
about reliability were a matter for cross-examination.60
In 2015, ignoring the NRC report’s critiques, the Eleventh Circuit in
United States v. Dale61 dismissed arguments that fingerprint and handwriting
comparisons were potentially unreliable scientific evidence. The court
cases from several jurisdictions and noting that the “the nuanced report, while critical of
various aspects of the ACE-V methodology, does not in itself establish a lack of general
acceptance among the relevant scientific community or otherwise undermine the uniform body
of precedent rejecting admissibility challenges to print evidence”); Commonwealth v.
Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50, 59–60 (Mass. 2010) (“We recognize, however, that the issues
highlighted in the [NRC] report are important, and deserve consideration. Nevertheless, we
do not undertake such consideration in this case. The [NRC] Report accepts as ‘plausible’ the
proposition that ‘a careful comparison of two impressions can accurately discern whether or
not they had a common source.’” (quoting NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 142)).
54. As described by the Advisory Committee in the notes to the 2000 amendments, the
factors include
(1) whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested—that is,
whether the expert’s theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether
it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be
assessed for reliability; (2) whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer
review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or
theory when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls;
and (5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific
community.
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes on 2000 amendments. Despite this
interpretation of “tested” to require an objective, rather than subjective, conclusory approach,
courts have not adopted this interpretation with respect to forensic-science evidence. The
“subjectivity of a methodology is not fatal under Rule 702 and Daubert, as ‘a court may admit
well-founded testimony based on specialized training and experience.’” United States v.
Ashburn, 88 F. Supp. 3d 239, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting United States v. Montiero, 407
F. Supp. 2d 351, 371 (D. Mass. 2006)).
55. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes on 2000 amendments.
56. Kaye, supra note 45, at 1649.
57. See, e.g., Luna, 989 N.E.2d at 667 (noting that courts may take judicial notice of
general acceptance by looking to “unequivocal and undisputed prior judicial decisions”
(quoting People v. McKown, 875 N.E.2d 1029, 1034 (Ill. 2007))).
58. See, e.g., id. at 679.
59. United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009) (upholding the decision
to admit fingerprints despite concerns whether the evidence met all of the Daubert
requirements).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Myshawn Bonds, No. 15 CR 573-2, 2017 WL 4511061, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2017).
61. 618 F. App’x 494 (11th Cir. 2015).
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described the arguments as both meritless and foreclosed by 1999 and 2005
opinions—both of which predated the NRC and PCAST reports.62 The court
did not mention the Daubert factors or Rule 702’s reliability requirements.
Rather, without any explanation of why, the court asserted that the experts
“used scientifically reliable methodology.”63 In United States v. John,64 the
Fifth Circuit noted that
absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to
satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert. “Fingerprint identification has been
admissible as reliable evidence in criminal trials in this country since at
least 1911.” In terms of specific Daubert factors, the reliability of the
technique has been tested in the adversarial system for over a century and
has been routinely subject to peer review.65

These three cases are not outliers but are the typical response of courts to
reliability challenges to various forms of FCM evidence. Avoiding the
pointed science-based critiques of FCM evidence or the complexity of
matching feature-comparison methods of forensic science appears to be
foundational in many judicial decisions on the subject. Rather than
addressing the complexity head on and resolving it, courts tend to use a
variety of analysis-avoiding methods in evaluating the reliability of FCM
evidence, even after learning of its shortcomings in the NRC report. For
example, in Meskimen v. Commonwealth,66 the Supreme Court of Kentucky
considered a challenge to the reliability of “microscopic hair comparison,”
where the defendant had argued, pretrial, that hair comparison was
unreliable.67 Not only did the trial court admit the evidence, but it took
judicial notice that the hair comparison was scientifically reliable and
declined to hold a Daubert hearing.68 On appeal, the defendant brought to
the court’s attention the NRC report on the unreliability of microscopic hair
comparison. The court rejected the defendant’s concern, upholding the
decision about judicial notice of reliability. In finding no error, the court
noted that it has a “duty to ensure that method is supported by scientific
findings, or at least not seriously questioned by recent reputable scientific
findings, before taking judicial notice of its acceptability.”69 What the court
failed to address, however, is noteworthy: the NRC report concluded there
was “no scientific support for the use of hair comparisons for
individualization in the absence of nuclear DNA.”70 Despite that conclusion,
the court held that a Daubert hearing was not required as “[m]icroscopic hair

62. Id. at 497.
63. Id.
64. 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
65. Id. at 274–75 (quoting United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2003)).
66. 435 S.W.3d 526 (Ky. 2013).
67. Id. at 530.
68. Id. at 535.
69. Id. at 535–36. The court cited the problem of bullet-lead analysis as an example of
“junk science,” noting the reversal of a conviction involving such evidence. Id. at 536 n.10
(citing Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2006)).
70. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 161 (emphasis added).
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analysis is a scientifically reliable method” that has been admissible in
Kentucky for many years.71
Curiously, the court vaguely refers to the NRC report’s critique of haircomparison evidence in a footnote and states that “hair analysis has been
called into question by several recent findings, including those of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.”72 But the court does not mention that the NRC
report’s conclusion regarding the lack of scientific support for hair
comparison revealed that 90 percent of the trial transcripts reviewed
contained erroneous statements about hair comparison—a finding
corroborated the FBI and the Innocence Project.73 It also failed to mention
that twenty-six out of twenty-eight agents or analysts provided testimony or
submitted laboratory reports with erroneous statements.74
In the first reported case to cite the PCAST report, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois was not swayed by the concerns raised in
the report and concluded that the shortcomings of fingerprint comparison
were only questions of weight, not admissibility.75 Any concerns, the court
stated, could be addressed on cross-examination.76 Likewise, and consistent
with prior decisions,77 the court declined to limit the expert from providing a
conclusion about a match or otherwise limiting the opinion of the
government’s expert.78 Finding that the PCAST report was simply
“advisory,”79 the court continued along the same, well-worn path.
III. MAKING DECISIONS
To address the problem of judicial resistance to seriously addressing the
shortcomings of FCM evidence, insights from cognitive science may help to
explain how judges think.
A. Thinking: Fast or Slow?
Renowned psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky met in
1969 and worked together on an almost-daily basis for the next decade and a

71. Meskimen, 435 S.W.3d at 535.
72. Id. at 535 n.9.
73. See id.; see also Press Release, FBI, FBI Testimony on Microscopic Hair Analysis
Contained Errors in at Least 90 Percent of Cases in Ongoing Review (Apr. 20, 2015),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-testimony-on-microscopic-hairanalysis-contained-errors-in-at-least-90-percent-of-cases-in-ongoing-review
[https://perma.cc/MPT8-2NEP].
74. See Press Release, FBI, supra note 73.
75. United States v. Myshawn Bonds, No. 15 CR 573-2, 2017 WL 4511061, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 10, 2017).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 486 (7th Cir. 2013).
78. Myshawn Bonds, 2017 WL 4511061, at *3. The court also granted the government’s
request that the defendant not be allowed to cross-examine the analyst about the Brandon
Mayfield case, in which the FBI wrongly identified Mayfield’s fingerprints indicating his
involvement in the Madrid train bombing case. Id. at *4.
79. Id. at *3 (stating that the court “agrees with the government that the PCAST report
presents only advisory recommendations concerning validity”).
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half.80 During that time, they “invented questions and jointly examined
[their] intuitive answers.”81 Each day yielded multiple questions, and each
question became a small experiment.82 The goal was not to determine
whether the intuition was correct but to assume that many intuitive thoughts
were shared and to demonstrate the effect that these intuitive thoughts had on
judgments.83 From many decades of work, they developed an exceptionally
influential theory of cognitive science, which reasons that humans have two
systems for thinking—fast and slow, also described respectively as “intuitive
and deliberate thought processes.”84 Kahneman was awarded the Nobel
Prize for work that followed from their discoveries.85
“A defining property of intuitive thoughts,” Kahneman wrote in his Nobel
Prize lecture, “is that they come to mind spontaneously, like percepts.”86
These types of intuitive decisions, termed “System 1 decisions,”87 are “fast,
automatic, effortless, associative, and difficult to control or modify.”88 By
comparison, the decision-making processes termed System II are “slower,
serial, effortful, and deliberately controlled; they are also relatively flexible
and potentially rule-governed.”89 Kahneman also explains that these
different systems of decision-making have other defining attributes. For
example, System I generates what he terms “impressions of the attributes of
objects of perception and thought.”90 That is to say, these impressions are
not voluntary and often not verbally explicit. By comparison, System II is
involved in judgments, which are “explicit and intentional.”91
We all use both systems of making decisions—although some claim these
two systems are more of a continuum than a binary system.92 The system
used depends on the nature of the problem presented and possibly on the level
of expertise the person has in resolving those types of problems.93 But the
80. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 6 (2011).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Daniel Kahneman, Nobel Prize Lecture: Maps of Bounded Rationality: A
Perspective on Intuitive Judgment and Choice 449 (Dec. 8, 2002),
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2002/kahnemannlecture.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE9Q-RV2R].
85. Amos Tversky had passed away before the Nobel Prize was awarded. See id.
86. Id. at 452.
87. Stanovich and West labeled the two systems Type I and Type II. See Keith E.
Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the
Rationality Debate?, 23 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 645, 658–59 (2000).
88. Kahneman, supra note 84, at 450.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 451.
91. Id.
92. See Laura F. Mega et al., Do Intuitive and Deliberate Judgments Rely on Two Distinct
Neural Systems? A Case Study in Face Processing, FRONTIERS HUM. NEUROSCIENCE, Aug.
25, 2015, at 1, 2 (noting that, in contrast to the binary system, the “unified approaches propose
that intuitive and deliberate judgments rely on the same (or similar) rules, while differing only
along a dimension of consciousness”).
93. KAHNEMAN, supra note 80, at 33–35. “As you become skilled in a task, its demand
for energy diminishes. . . . A general ‘law of least effort’ applies to cognitive as well as
physical exertion.” Id. at 35.
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use of System II demands more cognitive energy and is more taxing; and, in
general, we tend to “gravitate to the least demanding course of action.”94 As
Kahneman points out, based upon his research, “laziness is built deep into
our nature.”95 Thus, we naturally resort to System I where we can conserve
cognitive energy for when we need it (such as meeting deadlines when
completing a law review article). System I runs automatically and generates
suggestions for System II, such as “impressions, intuitions, intentions, and
feelings.”96 As we generally believe our impressions and act on them,
System II endorses our original sense and turns them into behaviors.97
However, when there is a problem—as when System I does not offer a ready
answer (as would occur with a complex math problem)—System II begins to
take over and offers a surge of conscious attention.98 Thus, when thinking
about a more complicated problem than System I can manage, System II—
which requires much greater cognition and focus—begins to operate.99
Kahneman provides examples of how much effort is required for some
System II problems. For example, if you are asked to solve a complicated
multiplication problem while walking, you will likely stop walking and turn
your attention to the problem.100 System II is “deliberate, effortful, and
orderly.”101 When merging onto the highway, you generally stop talking or
may even turn the radio down. System II is an energy-dependent process.
While System II thinking engages in highly diverse forms of operations
related to thought, it is also regulating self-control, another reason it is energy
consumptive.102 Notably, however, System II is able to “hold and compare
two opposite arguments in the working memory,” while System I does not
even admit to the existence of an alternative.103
We generate intuitive ideas while taking a long drive on an uncrowded
road, or when walking a few miles without any real effort: “a stroll,” as
Kahneman says.104 We conjure up article ideas and book concepts easily,
without much effort. These ideas present themselves to us effortlessly and
spontaneously. Working through those ideas on the written page, however,
is much more complicated and laborious, as anyone who writes knows. But
those of us who write also know that some problems are simple to resolve in
writing, while some are more akin to a mathematical proof.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 24.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 39–40.
101. Id. at 20.
102. Diana Richards, When Judges Have a Hunch: Intuition (and Some Emotion) in
Judicial Decision-Making 2 (2016) [hereinafter Richards, When Judges Have a Hunch]
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009883
[https://perma.cc/M6FE-XPYF]. This manuscript was subsequently published. See generally
Diana Richards, When Judges Have a Hunch—Intuition and Experience in Judicial DecisionMaking, 102 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS & SOZIALPHILOSPHIE 245 (2016).
103. Richards, When Judges Have a Hunch, supra note 102 (manuscript at 2).
104. KAHNEMAN, supra note 80, at 39–40.
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When judges make legal decisions, are they using System I, System II, or
both? If they are in the courtroom making snap decisions, we assume they
will primarily be using System I. If they are writing opinions, we might
assume it is always System II. And yet, there may be more complexity to the
question in determining which system is at play.
Assume a lawyer asks a witness, “What did you say to the plaintiff at the
scene of the accident?” The opposing lawyer stands up and says “objection,
hearsay!” The judge—like all lawyers schooled in evidence—quickly and
intuitively recognizes that an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of
the matter asserted is hearsay.105 Given that the judge has become an expert
in matters of evidence due to longstanding practice with the subject,106 this
recognition is likely made nearly instantly and with little effort. It is, in short,
a paradigmatic System I process—quick, intuitive, and effortless.
The more difficult question to answer here is what happens when the
opposing lawyer provides a complex explanation for why the testimony
should be admissible as a hearsay exception. For example, assume the lawyer
argues the testimony is a prior consistent statement that occurred before a
motive to fabricate arose and after the suggestion of fabrication had been
leveled at the witness.107 Now the judge will likely have to stop, look at the
language of the rule, hear arguments from each side about when the statement
occurred and when the alleged motive to fabricate arose, and then a careful
judge will consult more authority to properly resolve the issue. The process
has become more effortful, more likely a System II problem at this point.
There is not an intuitive answer available, given the complexity of the hearsay
exception at issue.
Judges make decisions all day and must categorize many issues as System
I problems or they would simply not have the cognitive energy left to tackle
all the questions they must resolve. System II decisions are energy
draining.108 President Obama noted this precise problem of decision fatigue
105. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as “a statement that: (1) the declarant does
not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement”).
106. Expertise in an area allows more complex thoughts to become more automatic, System
I decisions. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 80, at 35.
107. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d). Rule 801(d) provides:
Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the following conditions
is not hearsay:
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is subject
to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement:
....
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered:
(i) to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently
fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so
testifying . . . [.]
Id. For proof of the complexity of applying Rule 801(d)(1)(B), see generally Laird C.
Kirkpatrick & Christopher B. Mueller, Prior Consistent Statements: The Dangers of
Misinterpreting Recently Amended Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), 84 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. ARGUENDO 192 (2016).
108. See Richards, When Judges Have a Hunch, supra note 102 (manuscript at 2).
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when he famously said that he wore only gray or blue suits to try to “pare
down decisions” because he had too many other decisions to make.109 “You
need to focus your decision-making energy. You need to routinize
yourself.”110
Likewise, judges must apply System I thinking to avoid decision
fatigue.111 For example, in writing opinions, much of the rote citations to
subjects such as standard of review, jurisdiction, and precedents on point, are
likely to be System I decisions—automatic and effortless. Judges try not to
reinvent the wheel on every summary judgment decision in which they
explain the framework for making that decision. And for admissibility
questions presented to the court that have been decided in a consistent way
by that court and its sister courts, the pressure to consider the issue as an easy
problem that can be answered safely by reference to those court decisions
would likely be strong.
By comparison, Daubert hearings are notorious for being time and effort
intensive. A typical Daubert hearing and opinion would seem to rest fully in
System II thought, given the complexity of the subject and the need to “hold
and compare two opposite arguments” in the working memory.112 Unless,
of course, the problem is perceived as simple, at which point System I might
essentially hijack the cognitive process and the court might simply apply
precedent or look to the decisions of sister courts.
The unconscious draw to rely on System I thinking to resolve FCM
evidence issues without a deep explanation of the Daubert factors might be
strong, particularly when there are troubling problems with the evidence that
might result in an unpopular opinion to exclude or substantially limit its
admissibility.113 During the conference at Boston College Law School that
109. Michael Lewis, Obama’s Way, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 2012), https://www.vanityfair.com/
news/2012/10/michael-lewis-profile-barack-obama [https://perma.cc/VG9A-N28U].
110. Id. In addition to making decisions about legal questions, judges have a great deal of
case management responsibilities that incentivize them to find ways to clear their dockets,
which creates additional pressures to decide matters expediently. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt
et al., Multiple Constraint Satisfaction in Judging, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING 27, 31 (David E. Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010).
111. Whether judges employ System I or System II, of course, may depend on the level of
effort they believe supports their needs, differentiating between easy cases and those that
require more scrutiny. See Lawrence Baum, Motivation and Judicial Behavior: Expanding
the Scope of the Inquiry, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 110,
at 3, 18–21 (discussing how intermediate courts use central staff law clerks to handle the
perceived easier cases and how judges give “more limited scrutiny to cases that they
characterize as easy”).
112. Id.
113. The clearest example of an unpopular decision about forensic science is the original
opinion in United States v. Llera Plaza (Llera Plaza I), 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa.),
vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002). In Llera Plaza I, Judge Louis Pollak held that
the government had failed to scientifically demonstrate that a latent fingerprint originated from
a particular individual. Id. at 518. He concluded that the examiner would be permitted to
testify only about points of similarity between the known and latent prints but could not give
an opinion that the latent print came from a particular person. Id.; see also United States v.
Llera Plaza (Llera Plaza II), 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (describing the ruling
in Llera Plaza I). After an outcry from the FBI and the DOJ, the court permitted a
supplemental evidentiary hearing and changed its position and held that the testimony met the
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gave rise to this symposium, one federal district court judge described the
substantial time committed to both Daubert hearings and opinions in civil
cases.114 Other speakers—generally from the plaintiffs’ bar—discussed how
such Daubert hearings are incredibly time-intensive and expensive.
According to the speakers, virtually every federal civil case involved a
defense challenge to the plaintiff’s expert testimony. Judges must make
fairly quick decisions about what legal questions merit their deep attention
and which questions can be handled quickly. Unfortunately but fairly clearly,
judges have relegated FCM to the latter category.
B. Framing the Issue: Gains or Losses; Simple or Complex?
Decisions about which types of issues are effort-intensive and which are
less complex may follow from how the court, or the parties, frame the issue.
As cognitive scientists explain, how we frame an issue affects the choices we
make—known as “framing effects.”115 Framing has been described as “the
tendency to treat gains differently from losses.”116 In their 1981 article, “The
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Tversky and
Kahneman explain the term “decision frame” as one that refers to “the
decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies
associated with a particular choice.”117 This chosen frame is partly guided
by the problem itself and partly by the “norms, habits, and personal
characteristics of the decision-maker.”118 In addition, even small and
seemingly unimportant changes in the formulation of the problem can cause
significant shifts of preference.119
Since Tversky and Kahneman’s paper was published, studies have proven
that how a problem is framed can significantly influence the choices people
make when evaluating risk.120 For example, assume a hypothetical criminal
case with critical microscopic hair-comparison evidence framed in two ways.
In the first way, fact finders are told that 97 percent of all hair comparisons
performed using a comparison microscope are accurate for a 100-day period
in which roughly twenty comparisons a day are performed. Fact finders
would likely determine that the hair comparison in the instant case is
accurate—focusing on the 97 percent accuracy rate. By comparison, if fact
finders are told that in this same 100-day period, sixty faulty comparisons
Daubert requirements. Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 522, 576; see also D.H. Kaye, The
Nonscience of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera-Plaza, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1073,
1073 (2003) (discussing the reaction to the Llera Plaza I decision).
114. This point was made by the Honorable Patti B. Saris, Chief Judge of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts. Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert,
and Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1463, 1535 (2018) (statement of Hon. Patti B. Saris).
115. See generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky
eds., 2000).
116. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?,
79 OR. L. REV. 61, 98 (2000).
117. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology
of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 457.
120. KAHNEMAN, supra note 80, at 368–69.
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occurred—approximately one error every three days—the fact finders might
well find the error rate more meaningful in evaluating the facts of the case.
The data, of course, are the same, but the framing of the problem influences
how fact finders would evaluate the risk of error in the given case.
Additionally, how the litigants present the evidence might well affect how
the court ultimately frames the issue. If prosecutors tell the court that “this
evidence has been admitted in virtually all courts for decades and has
properly formed the basis of many convictions,” a judge may immediately
frame the admissibility of the evidence as an easy problem in which many
other courts have found no reason to exclude it. An example of the lure of
System I thinking can be found in the language of John, in which the Fifth
Circuit declined to even hold a Daubert hearing, instead invoking history and
disregarding the concerns about the reliability of the evidence: “Fingerprint
identification has been admissible as reliable evidence . . . since at least
1911.”121 Courts frame the FCM evidence question as a historical problem
and one that many others judges have already solved. Thus, the choice to
part from history and the decisions of sister courts would seem to be the far
riskier decisions and the one to be avoided. As humans treat potential gains
differently from loss, the safer decision is to admit the evidence.
Additional research explains how framing a problem as simple or complex
affects whether we employ System I or II decision-making and the
concomitant likelihood of error. In the classic bat-and-ball problem,122
subjects are told that a bat and ball together cost $1.10 and that the bat costs
$1.00 more than the ball and finally are asked how much the ball costs. Most
people immediately answer “ten cents.” The answer seems obvious but, after
doing the math, it is clearly wrong. The ball costs five cents and the bat costs
one dollar more: $1.05. But for most people, the “ten cent” answer felt
correct. It had an intuitive, quick appeal to it that many smart people assumed
was correct—but it was wrong. By framing the problem as simple, the
decision-maker determined the answer quickly, intuitively, and incorrectly.
Most people assume they would not be fooled by what appears to be the
correct answer but, indeed, they are fooled. Studies at a variety of institutions
show that most people make the error and are unable to suppress the intuitive
answer that comes to mind.123 Some have wondered whether judges are also
subject to making errors by relying on intuitive answers. One could
hypothesize that judges, who make multiple serious decisions on a daily

121. United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274–75 (5th Cir. 2010).
122. See Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall
2005, at 25, 26–27. Discussions about this test abound in legal, popular, and scientific
literature. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 n.51 (2007) (using the problem and citing popular media
descriptions); Jonah Lehrer, Why Smart People Are Stupid, NEW YORKER (June 12, 2012),
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/frontal-cortex/why-smart-people-are-stupid
[https://perma.cc/6H9W-28CQ].
123. See Guthrie et al., supra note 122, at 11.
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basis, are not so prey to the shortcomings of intuition, given that they are
“experts” at decision-making.124
C. Judges Making Decisions
How judges make decisions and what factors affect those processes have
been the subject of much literature over the last several decades.125 More
recently, many scholars have focused on the role that psychological factors
may have on judicial decision-making.126 Professors Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich have conducted empirical
examinations designed to determine how judges make decisions.127 In one
study, they tested intuitive versus deliberative decision-making, employing
the bat-and-ball problem as well as two other cognitive-reflection tests
(CRTs), to see if judges made decisions in a fashion that differed from
others.128 When answering the bat-and-ball problem,129 approximately 28
percent answered the question correctly.130 As the questions progressed and
became more difficult, the accuracy percentage of the answers improved to
between 44 percent and 50 percent.131 These numbers, the authors note, are
consistent with test-taking students from universities where the original
CRTs were run; slightly better than those at the University of Michigan, and
124. On the issue of expertise in judicial decision-making, see Fredrick Schauer, Is There
a Psychology of Judging?, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, supra note
110, at 103, 113–14; Barbara A. Spellman, Judges, Expertise, and Analogy, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 110, at 149, 152.
125. See Moriarty, supra note 2, at 317 n.118 (collecting citations from scholars on judicial
decision-making). See generally Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First
Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049 (2006) (addressing multiple approaches judges employ to
decide cases). One interesting strand of the literature has focused on whether judges decide
cases by “hunch.” See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
“Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 275–76 (1929). See generally Linda L.
Berger, A Revised View of the Judicial Hunch, 10 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 1 (2013); Mark
C. Modak-Truran, A Pragmatic Justification of the Judicial Hunch, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 55
(2001); R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L. REV.
1381 (2006); Richards, When Judges Have a Hunch, supra note 102. The issue whether a
“hunch” is synonymous or different from an intuitive decision is one that Diana Richards
addresses and is one worth discussing, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally
Richards, When Judges Have a Hunch, supra note 102.
126. See generally THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 110; Terry
A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1485 (2011);
Moriarty, supra note 2; Nicole E. Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking, Empathy, and the
Limits of Perception, 47 AKRON L. REV. 693 (2014); Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of
Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1998); Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black
Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511 (2004).
127. See generally Guthrie et al., supra note 122; Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); Chris Guthrie et al., The “Hidden Judiciary”: An
Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477 (2009); Andrew J.
Wistrich et al., Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?,
93 TEX. L. REV. 855 (2015); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).
128. Guthrie et al., supra note 122, at 13. In this study, approximately 181 judges answered
the three questions of the CRT. Id.
129. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
130. Guthrie et al., supra note 122, at 15.
131. Id.
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slightly lower than those at Harvard.132 When all three questions were
combined and analyzed, there was no statistically significant difference
between male and female, experienced and inexperienced, and Democrat and
Republican judges.133 Collectively, the authors note, although “roughly oneseventh of the judges answered all three [questions] deliberatively,” many
were able to answer at least one of the problems deliberatively.134 As a
group, however, judges leaned toward intuitive rather than deliberative
problem-solving.135 Of course, a three-question CRT is not the same as what
judges do on the bench, a point noted by the authors.136 But it does provide
some insight into how judges think. And as it turns out, they think pretty
much like everyone else: when judges perceive a problem to be simple, they
revert to intuitive decision-making.137
As Kahneman and others have learned, there are serious concerns about
intuitive decision-making that arise from the use of heuristics and the
subsequent likelihood of cognitive biases. These problems are likely to affect
judges making decisions.
When framing a problem as simple, one tends to unknowingly rely on
intuitive decision-making, a form of thinking that is prone to using heuristics.
Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts used to solve a problem, or what Kahneman
defined as “a simple procedure that helps find adequate, though often
imperfect, answers to difficult questions.”138 Reliance upon heuristics,
however, can lead to systematic biases.139 Cognitive biases, which are
understood as consistent errors or fallacies, are ones to which we all fall prey,
even when we try to guard against them.140 There are multiple forms of
cognitive bias with names that explain the nature of the bias: confirmation

132. Id. at 14.
133. Id. at 18.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 17.
136. Id. at 18–19.
137. It may be, of course, that when judges decide cases, they do so as experts and thus
their decision-making would differ from how they make decisions about bat-and-ball
problems. For more, see Spellman, supra note 124, at 152 (noting the differences between
experts and novices in given domains of expertise).
138. KAHNEMAN, supra note 80, at 98.
139. See HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 731 (Thomas
Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3–4 (1982); see also JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 53
(4th ed. 2008) (“People develop heuristics exactly because they are often useful. But the use
of these heuristics leads to biases.”).
140. KAHNEMAN, supra note 80, at 430.
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bias,141 hindsight bias,142 belief perseverance,143 groupthink,144 and the
sunk-cost fallacy.145 Many of these biases are relevant to judicial decisions
about FCM evidence and may explain the judicial resistance to taking
reliability concerns seriously.
Some of these biases are exhibited in the cases. As proof of confirmation
bias, the courts continue to seek out information that confirms their existing
beliefs that FCM evidence should be admissible: looking to prior cases (even
ones that predate the NRC report or the Daubert and Rule 702 reliability
requirements) and findings ways to avoid the serious concerns raised in the
NRC report about the shortcomings of the evidence. At the same time, they
avoid anything that would challenge their existing belief, such as the strong
association between faulty forensics and wrongful conviction. For example,
the court in Meskimen admitted microscopic hair testimony—noting its long
history of admission—and omitted the concern of the NRC report that
counsels against it due to overwhelming proof that such evidence is
flawed.146 The court looked at the NRC report but only saw what confirmed
its own opinion.147
Likewise, the role that belief perseverance has in these decisions is also
strong: the constant references to history and the repeated references to
remaining faithful to tradition despite the serious concerns about reliability
raised in the NRC report are all indicative of the “tendency to maintain
existing beliefs in the face of evidence that ought to weaken or even totally
reverse those beliefs.”148 The “groupthink” problem is also prevalent in the
decisions where courts repeatedly refer to sister courts to confirm that all in
the group are thinking alike.
All in all, the opinions admitting FCM evidence without limitation or
concern seem to follow the same, worn formula of treating the problem of
141. Confirmation bias refers to the seeking or the interpretation of evidence in a manner
that supports one’s existing beliefs or expectations. See generally Raymond S. Nickerson,
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175
(1998).
142. Hindsight bias occurs when people believe that they knew something before they had
information that would allow them to know it; for example, when students in class “knew”
they were going to be called on. See BARON, supra note 139, at 157–58. For further discussion,
see generally Neal J. Roese & Kathleen D. Vohs, Hindsight Bias, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI.
411 (2012).
143. Belief perseverance is the “tendency to maintain existing beliefs in the face of
evidence that ought to weaken or even totally reverse those beliefs.” Philip E. Tetlock,
Accountability and the Perseverance of First Impressions, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 285, 285
(1983).
144. BARON, supra note 139, at 224–26 (describing groupthink and noting that, in some
circumstances, an individual decision may seem more “right” because it is shared by others in
the group).
145. “Sunk cost” refers to an individual’s unwillingness to withdraw from an endeavor after
investing money, time, or effort: the individual is simply too invested to change direction. See
BARON, supra note 139, at 305–07. See generally Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The
Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124
(1985).
146. Meskimen v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 526, 535 (Ky. 2013).
147. Id. at 535 n.9.
148. Tetlock, supra note 143, at 285.
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FCM evidence as an easy issue, which results in the use of heuristics with
their attendant cognitive biases. The pressing concern is whether there is any
hope for change.
CONCLUSION
Sadly, it seems unlikely that a sea change will occur in the way courts
approach FCM evidence. In the decade following the NRC report, the cases
suggest that courts are simply intractable in their approach to admitting the
evidence. Prosecutors have continued to argue, both in court and to the
media, that forensic science is reliable and that both the NRC report and
PCAST report are irrelevant.149 Convincing courts otherwise seems to be
nearly impossible. Courts have categorized FCM evidence admissibility as
a simple problem and have avoided addressing the serious questions about its
reliability.
There is a potential for change, however, with a change to Rule 702 that
requires the judiciary to pay closer attention to the requirements of reliability.
The Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee’s notes, mentioned
above, suggest a first step. The notes describe testing as “whether the
expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested—that is, whether the
expert’s theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether it is
instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be
assessed for reliability.”150 If Rule 702 embraced that requirement of
objective proof, rather than a “subjective, conclusory approach,” it might
help the courts to move toward a better method of gatekeeping with respect
to FCM evidence. This potential for change, however, will not be realized
until courts recognize that matching a known and an unknown sample is a
very complicated endeavor.

149. See Spencer S. Hsu, White House Science Advisers Urge Justice Dept., Judges, to
Raise Forensic Standards, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2016), http://wapo.st/2d02qi7?tid=
ss_tw&utm_term=.e6a7d761cc37 [https://perma.cc/P296-3NC6] (discussing the PCAST
report and including comments from federal and state prosecutors dismissing the report’s
claims).
150. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes on 2000 amendments.

